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Background and objectives: This study examines the effects of a single session of Cognitive Bias Modiﬁ-
cation to induce positive Interpretative bias (CBM-I) using standard or explicit instructions and an
analogue of computer-administered CBT (c-CBT) program on modifying cognitive biases and social
anxiety.
Methods: A sample of 76 volunteerswith social anxiety attended a research site. At both pre- and post-test,
participants completed two computer-administered tests of interpretative and attentional biases and a
self-report measure of social anxiety. Participants in the training conditions completed a single session of
either standard or explicit CBM-I positive training and a c-CBT program. Participants in the Control (no
training) condition completed a CBM-I neutral task matched the active CBM-I intervention in format and
duration but did not encourage positive disambiguation of socially ambiguous or threatening scenarios.
Results: Participants in both CBM-I programs (either standard or explicit instructions) and the c-CBT
condition exhibitedmore positive interpretations of ambiguous social scenarios at post-test and one-week
follow-up as compared to the Control condition. Moreover, the results showed that CBM-I and c-CBT, to
some extent, changed negative attention biases in a positive direction. Furthermore, the results showed
that both CBM-I training conditions and c-CBT reduced social anxiety symptoms at one-week follow-up.
Limitations: This study used a single session of CBM-I training, however multi-sessions intervention
might result in more endurable positive CBM-I changes.
Conclusions: A computerised single session of CBM-I and an analogue of c-CBT program reduced negative
interpretative biases and social anxiety.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license. 1. Introduction
Cognitive-behavioural models of social anxiety (Beck, Emery, &
Greenberg, 1985; Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997)
propose that negative self-appraisals in social situations inﬂuence
the development andmaintenance of social anxiety. These negative: þ61 02 49216980.
u.au, s_mobini@yahoo.com
r Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.appraisals may result from elaborative processing of negative in-
formation including biases in attention, interpretation, judgement,
andmemory (Clark &McManus, 2002; Heinrichs & Hofmann, 2001;
Hirsch & Clark, 2004; Ledley & Heimberg, 2006; Musa & Lépine,
2000). A wealth of literature suggests that socially-anxious in-
dividuals are more likely to attend to social threat information (see
Bögels & Mansell, 2004; Schultz & Heimberg, 2008, for reviews).
Similarly, a number of studies reported that socially-anxious in-
dividuals interpret ambiguous social information in a negative or
less positive manner (Amir, Beard, & Bower, 2005; Hertel,
Brozovich, Joormann, & Gotlib, 2008; Huppert, Pasupuleti, Foa, &
Mathews, 2007; Stopa & Clark, 2000). Given that social anxiety is
associated with negative cognitive biases, a next phase of research
is to establish whether such biases are amenable to modiﬁcations
or treatment (Mobini, Reynolds, & Mackintosh, 2013). 
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method is a text-based computerised task aimed at systematically
training individuals to interpret emotionally ambiguous informa-
tion in a particular direction (Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000). Sub-
sequently, laboratory studies have developed a number of CBM
interventions to directly modify cognitive biases associated with
anxiety via repeated practice on computerised cognitive tasks (see
Beard, 2011). This line of research suggests that it is possible to
experimentally manipulate (or ‘train’) interpretation bias in healthy
volunteers (e.g., Mackintosh, Mathews, Yiend, Ridgeway, & Cook,
2006; Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000; Yiend, Mackintosh, &
Mathews, 2005). So far, a few published studies have used CBM
procedures to modify interpretation biases in participants who
have social anxiety (e.g., Beard & Amir, 2008; Murphy, Hirsch,
Mathews, Smith, & Clark, 2007; Turner, Hoppitt, Hodgekin,
Mackintosh, & Fowler, 2011). The results of these studies have
shown that it is possible to induce positive interpretations in
socially-anxious individuals and reduce social anxiety symptoms.
Although these CBM studies have reported successful modiﬁ-
cations of interpretative bias, the method invariably avoids
providing explicit instructions about the intention of the training.
Instead, repeated practice is provided in which participants are
guided to take a particular interpretation and they typically are not
explicitly informed of the training contingency. This is based on the
assumption that the training contingency is registered standardly
and exerts an incidental impact on processing selectivity (Mathews
& Mackintosh, 2000). If CBM-I operates at a more habitual level,
then it may be resistant to manipulation by verbal instructions.
Despite anticipating a continuing role for incidental learning in
many CBM variants, it may be likely that the judicious use of
explicit instructions at times will enhance conscious processing of
the training materials, and hence enhancing CBM efﬁcacy. A few
recent studies using different variants of CBM with explicit in-
structions reported beneﬁcial effects of CBM delivery (Krebs,
Hirsch, & Mathews, 2010; Schartau, Dalgleish, & Dunn, 2009;
Watkins, Baeyens, & Read, 2009). Watkins et al. (2009) explicitly
told participants with dysphoria that the training exercises were
designed to reduce their negative thinking and thereby reduce
depression. Participants in Schartau et al.’s (2009) study were
required to systematically practice appraising events so as to
reduce the negative affect they experienced. Similarly, in the pre-
sent study participants in the explicit CBM-I condition were made
aware of the intention of the CBM positive training, however, unlike
two previous studies they were not asked to practice the training
materials at home (Watkins et al., 2009) or transfer what they
learned to day-to-day experience (Schartau et al., 2009). More
recently, using an attentional variant of CBM Krebs and colleagues
(Krebs et al., 2010) found that providing participants with explicit
instructions about the relationship between word valence and
target location in a dot-probe task resulted in more effective
attention modiﬁcation.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that directly instructing par-
ticipants to process information in a certain way could have a
paradoxical effect (Wegner & Schneider, 2003). Consistent with this
view, it is suggested that explicit instructions to selectively avoid
speciﬁc categories of information may sometimes be unhelpful in
CBM approaches (MacLeod, Martinez, & Williams, 2009). However,
the validity of this assumption has not yet been tested adequately
by a direct comparison between standard and explicit instructions
in CBM-I training. It is not yet clear whether the provision of
explicit instructions about the purpose of the training in the CBM-I
paradigm developed by Mathews and Mackintosh (2000) would
enhance or compromise the training effects on interpretative bias
and social anxiety. The ﬁrst aim of this study was, therefore, to
assess the effects of standard vs. explicit instructions methods ofthe CBM-I training on interpretive bias and social anxiety in a high
socially-anxious anxious sample.
There is a juxtaposition between the CBM-I approach which
operates through standard learning and other established thera-
pies, such as cognitive-behaviour therapy (CBT), in which patients
are made consciously aware of the thoughteemotion link as a
mechanism for therapeutic change and are encouraged to actively
engage in modifying unhelpful thinking and misinterpretations in
order to feel less anxious or depressed. Franklin and colleagues
found that group CBT reduced negative interpretation bias in so-
cially phobic individuals (Franklin, Huppert, Langner, Leiberg, &
Foa, 2005). However, no study has yet compared two versions of
CBM-I methods (standard vs. explicit) and CBT in modiﬁcation of
cognitive biases in social anxiety. For the purpose of comparing
CBM-I approach with a more explicit therapeutic intervention, an
analogue of computer-administered CBT (c-CBT) program was
developed and used in this study. Thus, the second aim of the
present study was to investigate whether CBM-I induced changes
are comparable with a treatment method whereby participants
were directly educated about and subsequentlymade fully aware of
the role of negative thinking in causing and maintaining social
anxiety.
A third and ﬁnal aim of the study was to examine whether any
positive effects caused by CBM-I training or c-CBT are speciﬁc to
interpretation biases or these changes can also affect the earlier
stage of information processing, i.e., attention allocation. Beck and
Clark (1997) introduced a three-stage model of information pro-
cessing of anxiety consisting of (a) initial registration, (b) immediate
preparation, and (c) secondary elaboration. It is assumed that
attentional bias operates at the early stages of information pro-
cessing which are responsible for initial orienting to, and rapid
detection of, threat in the environment (Beck&Clark,1997;McNally,
1995). In contrast, interpretative bias appears to operate at the later
stages of information processing, possibly ‘immediate preparation’,
which are responsible for interpreting and judging about the threat
in the environment. Thus, the recognition of a negative stimulus
leads to the immediate preparation stage involving the activation of
the primal mode. Beck and Clark (1997) suggested that automatic
anxious thoughts and biased cognitive processing result from the
activation of the orienting and primal threat modes at the earlier
stages of information processing. One of the questions to be inves-
tigated iswhethermodiﬁcationof oneof the cognitiveprocesses, i.e.,
attention or interpretation, can result in changes in the other aspect
of cognitive processing. In a study, White and colleagues found that
individuals trained to attend to threat were more likely than in-
dividuals in a placebo training group to interpret ambiguous infor-
mation in a threat-relatedmanner (White, Suway, Pine, Bar-Haim, &
Fox, 2011). These data suggest that the preferential allocation of
attention towards threat in the initial stages of information may
result in a cascadeof subsequentprocessingbiases.However, it is not
clear whether modiﬁcation of negative interpretative biases can
deactivate negative attentional deployment. Thus, biasmodiﬁcation
procedures targetingboth attentionand interpretationbiaseswould
have clinical implications for the treatment of anxiety disorders (see
Mobini & Grant, 2007; Mobini et al., 2013). One can assume that
developing more benign and positive interpretations of ambiguous
situations may modify the orienting mode towards threat and
reduce negative attentional biases.
To our knowledge, no study has yet compared the effects of two
methods of CBM-I (standard vs. explicit instructions) and an
analogue of computer-administered CBT (c-CBT) on modifying
cognitive biases in social anxiety. Taken together, using experi-
mental methodology, the present study aims to investigate three
interesting research questions: 1) whether providing explicit in-
structions in CBM-I training can enhance its effects on
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the standard or explicit CBM-I positive training is more (or less)
effective, if any, than the computer-administered CBT (c-CBT) pro-
gram in reducing cognitive biases and social anxiety, and 3) ﬁnally
whether any changes in interpretative bias after the treatment
conditions can lead to changes in attentional biases. In general, it
was hypothesised that both standard and explicit CBM-I training
programs would reduce a negative interpretation bias and social
anxiety in socially-anxious participants and that providing explicit
instructions about the purpose of training would enhance the
positive effects of CBM-I training. Also, we hypothesised that
similar to CBM-I conditions, the c-CBT program would reduce a
negative interpretation bias and social anxiety. Finally, it was
hypothesised that positive changes in interpretative biases would
decrease attentional bias towards negative stimuli.
2. Material and methods
2.1. Participants
Seventy-six (N ¼ 76) socially-anxious volunteers aged between
18 and 60 who were recruited from the student and staff pop-
ulations at the University of East Anglia (UEA, United Kingdom)
took part in this study (see Table 1 for demographic information).
2.2. Design
The design of the study was a mixed experimental design with
type of treatment (Standard CBM-I, Explicit CBM-I, c-CBT, and
Control no training CBM-I) a between-subjects factor andmeasures
of attentional and interpretative biases and social anxiety scores in
three time intervals (pre-test, post-test and one-week follow-up) as
within-subject factors. Participants were allocated into the training
and control conditions through the computer-generated random-
isation procedure.
2.3. Social anxiety assessment
Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (FNE, Watson & Friend, 1969).
The FNE comprises 30 trueefalse items that refer to expectation
and distress related to negative evaluation from others in social
situations. It demonstrates good internal consistency
(a ¼ 0.88  0.94) and testeretest reliability over a 1-week period
(r ¼ 0.94) as well as good discriminative validity for social anxiety
(Oei, Kenna, & Evans,1991). Participants who scored 17 or higher on
the FNE were invited to take part in the study. A cut-off score of 17
on the FNE has been shown to be associated with high social
anxiety (Stopa & Clark, 2001).
2.4. Interpretative bias assessment
The interpretation bias was assessed individually using a text-
based encoding task in which participants were presented with aTable 1
Demographic information for each group.
Standard CBM-I
(n ¼ 19)
Explicit CBM-I
(n ¼ 19)
c-CBT
(n ¼ 19)
Control
(n ¼ 19)
Age M(SD) 25 (12) 21 (3) 25 (9) 23 (8)
Gender
(female)
13 (68%) 14 (74%) 15 (79%) 14 (74%)
Ethnicity 18 Caucasian
1 African
17 Caucasian
1 White/
Caribbean
1 Asian
15 Caucasian
1 White/Caribbean
1 Asian/White
2 Asian
16 Caucasian
2 Asian
1Asian/Whitenumber of ambiguous social scenarios and their interpretation of
these passages was assessed. This task has been widely used in a
number of studies investigating interpretative biases in anxiety
(e.g., Hertel et al., 2008; Mackintosh et al., 2006; Mathews &
Mackintosh, 2000). A recent study demonstrated that the inter-
pretative bias task is capable of differentiating between high and
low levels of neuroticism (Salemink & van den Hout, 2010).
Participants were presented with 15 ambiguous social scenarios
and instructed to imagine themselves in the situationwhile reading
each description as if they were actually there. Each scenario ended
ambiguously to allow participants to apply their own spontaneous
interpretation to the meaning of the passage. After participants
read all 15 scenarios, they were presented with identifying title of
each ambiguous scenario along with four interpretations in an
individually randomised order representing four different in-
terpretations of each previously presented ambiguous scenario,
one at a time. Two of these four sentences were target sentences
matches in meaning the positive and the negative potential inter-
pretation of the preceding ambiguous scenario. The remaining two
were foils, which did not correspond to either possible interpre-
tation of this preceding ambiguity but were positively and nega-
tively valenced. Foils were included to assess any wider priming
effects of training indicating a potential response bias for endorsing
any information of a certain emotional valence. Participants were
asked to rate each sentence according to how closely it corre-
sponded in meaning to what was described in the preceding sce-
nario. They made this rating using a 4-point Likert scale ranging
from 1 (very different in meaning) to 4 (very similar in meaning).
Three different versions of interpretation bias measure were used
over 3 phases, pre and post-tests and follow-up, in a counter-
balanced order.
2.5. Attentional bias task
The dot probe task was used to measure attentional bias. This
task is based on the idea that subjects tend to be faster to respond to
a probe stimulus (e.g., a small dot) that is presented in an attended,
rather than unattended, region of a visual display (MacLeod,
Mathews, & Tata, 1986). For the purpose of this study, a total of
108 word pairs, with members matched in terms of letter length
and frequency of usage, were selected from a larger initial pool
which included word pairs taken from similar studies (e.g.,
Asmundson & Stein, 1994; Pishyar et al., 2004). Each set of the dot
probe task consisted of 36 word pairs. For each set a threat word
was paired with its corresponding neutral word to make 12
negative-neutral pairs (e.g., boring vs. billet) and 12 physical
sensation-neutral word pairs (e.g., vomiting vs. modiﬁed). Simi-
larly, each positive word was paired with its corresponding neutral
word to make 12 positive-neutral word pairs (e.g., hopeful vs.
harvest).
Each trial commenced with the 500-ms central presentation of
the ﬁxation cue “þþþ.” Immediately following termination of this
display, the target and neutral members of a word pair were pre-
sented simultaneously for 500 ms, one just above and one just
below the ﬁxation position. The word pairs appeared in the middle
of the computer screen with a 3 cm vertical distance between the
twowords and the instructed viewing distance of 60 cm. The target
word appeared with equal probability in the upper screen location
or lower screen location. Upon the termination of this word pair
display, one of two probes, a small symbol pointing either to the left
(>) or to the right (<), immediately appeared in the location pre-
viously occupied by a randomly determined character in either
word. These signs remained on the screen until the participant
pressed the key. In the 8 practice trials presented at the start of the
task, participants received feedback (Correct or Incorrect) for their
Table 2
Means (M) and standard errors (SE) of bias scores for the target and foil sentences for
each group at pre-test, post-test, and one-week follow-up (N ¼ 76). Negative scores
represent less positive interpretations of new ambiguous social scenarios and pos-
itive scores represent more positive interpretations of these scenarios.
Standard CBM-I Explicit CBM-I c-CBT Control
Pre-test
Targets .65 (.13) .42 (.19) .42(.17) L.47 (.22)
Foils .10 (.07) .13 (.11) .17 (.12) .09 (.14)
Post-test
Targets .15* (.13) .53* (.18) .14* (.13) L.32 (.22)
Foils .14 (.07) .22 (.10) .33 (.16) .03 (.10)
Follow-up
Targets .28* (.14) .48** (.21) .34* (.12) L.37 (.22)
Foils .10 (.06) .19 (.08) .23 (.13) .09 (.15)
Note: Signiﬁcant differences are shown between each group (Standard CBM-I,
Explicit CBM-I, c-CBT and Control) and the Control Condition (Bold).
*p < .05, **p < .01.
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Participants were required to discriminate probe identity as quickly
as possible, by pressing the “z” key if it points to the left and the “m”
key if it points to the right. Participants were instructed to use their
right hand to press “m” and left hand to press “z” keys on a
keyboard. The probe stimulus remained on the screen until the
programme detected this response, after which the screen was
cleared, and the next trial commenced 500 ms later.
2.6. Cognitive bias modiﬁcation to induce positive interpretation
(CBM-I)
CBM-I method was a text-based computerised task in which
participants were trained during a number of trials to consistently
resolve ambiguous social situations in favour of either positive or
neutral outcomes via completion of word stems (Mathews &
Mackintosh, 2000; Murphy et al., 2007). The CBM-I positive
training group had 100 passages (ambiguous social scenarios
related to social interactions and social performance) that were
four lines in length. Participants were instructed to imagine
themselves in the situation while reading each passage as if they
were actually there. This is in line with Holmes and colleagues
ﬁndings that mental imagery is more effective than verbal training
in inducing positive mood (Holmes, Mathews, Dalgleish, &
Mackintosh, 2006). The passages were designed to stay emotion-
ally ambiguous until the last word (presented as a fragment, e.g.,
fri–d-y), that would always disambiguate the passage in a positive
way (friendly).
In contrast to the standard CBM-I condition in which partici-
pants were given the usual minimal instructions, in explicit CBM-I
participants were explicitly instructed that they would see
emotionally ambiguous scenarios, and to do well on the task they
should try and resolve the scenarios in a positive way. While the
general instructions were identical in both CBM-I programs, the
following instruction was provided for the participants in the
explicit CBM-I group: “In the main task, each situation will begin
emotionally ambiguously but turn out well in the end (like the ﬁnal
practice item). If you bear in mind that all the situations end positively
this will help you with the task.”
2.7. Control no training condition
In this control (no training) condition, the passages were similar
to those used in the CBM-I training condition, with the critical
exception that these passages did not communicate ambiguous
scenarios, amenable to positive or negative interpretation, but
unambiguous scenarios that are all emotionally neutral in tone.
2.8. Computer-administered CBT for social anxiety (c-CBT)
The c-CBT program used in this study was developed based on
cognitive models of social anxiety (Beck et al., 1985; Clark & Wells,
1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). The self-help materials were
adapted from self-help CBT-based guidebooks for social anxiety
(Antony & Swinson, 2008; Butler, 2008) and modiﬁed for use via
computer in a very condensedway. This programwas revised based
on the feedback from a pilot study with a small number of volun-
teers prior to using in the main study. The ﬁnal c-CBT programwas
presented as 55 PowerPoint slides on the PC monitor in text format
with relevant visual prompts on each slide to encourage self-
reﬂection. The c-CBT program was an alternative intervention to
compare the CBM-I effects with an analogue of computerised CBT.
The c-CBT for social anxiety was comprised of 3 main parts
including 1) psychoeducation about CBT and social anxiety, 2)
socialising to CBT model of social anxiety and the role of anxiety-provoking thoughts, assumptions and core beliefs in causing and
maintaining social anxiety, and 3) overcoming social anxiety using
behavioural and cognitive strategies. Throughout the program
participants were encouraged to reﬂect on their cognitions and
identify their negative automatic thoughts in social situations
using an imagery method. They were taught about the role of
cognitive distortions in avoidance behaviour and how their fear of
social situations can be maintained. The maintenance cycle was
discussed along with some behavioural and cognitive strategies to
break this cycle. Each part ended with a quiz consisting of seven
relevant questions for participants to answer. The aim of these
quizzes was to encourage participants to concentrate on the
training materials and consolidate their learning; in answering
these quizzes they were told that this is not a test of their learning.
The duration of completion of this program was approximately
45e50 min.
3. Results
The participants’ demographic information for each group is
depicted in Table 1. The four groups did not differ from each other in
terms of age, F(3,73) ¼ .29, p ¼ .66 and as shown in the Table 1
gender and ethnicity of the participants were evenly distributed
across four study groups.
3.1. Interpretation bias
Participants’ recognition ratings of disambiguated versions of
the ﬁnal sentences of the test scenarios were the main measure of
interest to show the persistence of any training effects. The mean
ratings for each participant were calculated across the four
different sentence type: negative target, positive target, negative
foil, and positive foil. Three bias scores for each participant (Pre-
test, Post-test, one-week follow-up) were calculated by subtracting
the mean recognition rating for the negative targets from the mean
recognition ratings for the positive targets. This gave each partici-
pant three bias scores that could range from 3 to þ3, with a
negative score indicating a negative bias and a positive score rep-
resenting a positive bias. Similar bias scores were calculated by
subtracting the mean recognition rating for the negative foils from
the mean recognition ratings for the positive foils.
Table 2 summarises the bias scores for target and foil sentences
(positive and negative) for each group at pre-test, post-test and
one-week follow-up. It was hypothesised that socially-anxious in-
dividuals in the CBM-I and c-CBT conditions would demonstrate an
increase in positive interpretations (and reduction in negative in-
terpretations) of ambiguous scenarios as compared to the control
Table 4
Means (M) and standard errors (SE) of bias scores for the social threat, physical
sensations, and positive word pairs for each group at pre-test, post-test, and one-
week follow-up (N ¼ 76). Negative scores represent a bias towards the emotional
stimulus of the pair.
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were entered into an omnibus three-way mixed ANOVA with
Group (standard CBM-I, explicit CBM, c-CBT, Control) as a between-
subjects factor and Time (pre-test, post-test, and follow-up), Sen-
tence Type (targets vs. foils), as within-subjects factors. The results
indicated a signiﬁcant three-way interaction effect,
Time  Sentence Type  Group, F(6,144) ¼ 2.17, p < .05. To follow
up this interaction and investigate group differences, the bias
change scores were subjected to one-way analysis of variance
(ANOVA). The results showed signiﬁcant group differences for
target sentences from pre-test to post-test, F(3,73) ¼ 2.87, p < .05,
and from pre-test to one-week follow-up F(3,73) ¼ 3.10, p < .05.
The change scores were then subjected to post-hoc comparisons
using the Fisher’s Least Signiﬁcant Difference (LSD). The results
revealed signiﬁcant group differences on targets from pre-test to
post-test between Standard CBM-I and Control, t(37) ¼ 2.20,
p < .05, d ¼ 1.12 , Explicit CBM-I and Control t(37) ¼ 2.62, p < .01,
d ¼ 1.88, and c-CBT and Control, t(37) ¼ 2.10, p < .05, d ¼ 1.09. No
such differences were observed between Standard CBM-I and
Explicit CBM-I (t < 1) or between CBM-I conditions and c-CBT
(t < 1). Furthermore, the results revealed signiﬁcant group differ-
ences on target sentences from pre-test to one-week follow-up
between Standard CBM-I and Control, t(37)¼ 2.32, p< .05, d¼ 1.55,
Explicit CBM-I and Control t(37) ¼ 2.72, p < .01, d ¼ 1.31, and c-CBT
and Control t(37) ¼ 2.07, p < .05, d ¼ 1.09. No signiﬁcant group
differences were observed on foil sentences from pre-test to post-
test and one-week follow-up (t < 1).
Taken together, these results suggest that both standard and
explicit CBM-I training conditions and c-CBT increased positive
interpretations of ambiguous social scenarios as compared to a
control condition. Moreover, the results suggest that providing
explicit instructions as compared to the standard method did not
enhance the CBM-I positive effects.
3.2. Gain scores
Furthermore, the gain scores were subjected to one-sample t-
tests to examine whether mean gain scores for pre-test to post-test
and from pre-test to follow-up for each group were signiﬁcantly
different from nil differences, zero point. The results are summar-
ised in Table 3, with both signiﬁcant and non-signiﬁcant ﬁndings.
The one-sample t-tests revealed signiﬁcant differences in the mean
gain scores of the interpretation bias for target sentences in the
Standard CBM-I, Explicit CBM-I, and c-CBT groups (t values from
2.16 to 4.20). However, no such differences were found for the
Control group. Moreover, no signiﬁcant differences were observed
in the mean gain scores of the interpretation bias for foil sentences
in each group (t values from .25 to .98). These results indicated that
participants in the Standards and Explicit CBM-I groups and c-CBT
group developed more positive (or less negative) interpretations of
ambiguous social scenarios.Table 3
Means (M) and Standard Error (SE) of the gain scores on the interpretation bias
measure for each group from pre-test to post-test and from pre-test to follow-up.
Standard CBM-I Explicit CBM-I c-CBT Control
Pre-test to post-test
Targets .80** (.23) .95*** (0.23) .49* (.22) .15 (.12)
Foils .04 (.10) .08 (.16) .16 (.14) .06 (.10)
Pre-test to follow-up
Targets .93** (.22) .90** (.26) .71** (.21) .10 (.17)
Foils .005 (.10) .06 (.12) .06 (.16) .003 (.15)
Note: Signiﬁcance levels (p values) indicate the differences of each gain score from
zero, one-sample t-test, two-tailed.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.3.3. Attentional bias
The second aim was to demonstrate changes in attentional bias
from pre- to post-test and one-week follow-up following treatment
conditions. We examined the reaction time observed on the 288
attentional test trials embedded within the dot probe task to
determine attentional distribution within each group of partici-
pants. Keeping with the approach adopted byMacLeod et al. (2002)
to minimize the inﬂuence of outlying data points, we calculated
median bias scores displayed within each experimental condition
for every participant. Using the difference formula, attentional bias
scores were calculated by subtracting the median response latency
for trials in which the probe replaced the neutral stimuli from the
median response latency for trials in which the probe replaced the
emotional stimuli, such that negative numbers denote greater bias
for emotional stimuli and positive numbers denote bias towards
the neutral stimulus of the pair. These bias scores are shown in
Table 4 for the social threat-neutral, physical sensation-neutral, and
positive-neutral word pairs for each group at pre-test, post-test and
follow-up.
To analyse the effects of training conditions on attentional bias
the participants’ bias scores were subjected to a two-way (4  3)
ANOVA with Training Group (Standard CBM-I, Explicit CBM-I, c-
CBT, Control) as a between-subjects factor and Time (pre-test, post-
test, and one-week follow-up) as within-subjects factors. This
analysis revealed a signiﬁcant two-way interaction effect of
Group  Time F(6,144) ¼ 2.15, p < .05, indicating that after training
the groups were different in terms of the response latencies to the
different word types. To investigate group differences the changes
in bias scores from pre-test to post-test and follow-up were sub-
jected to one-way ANOVA. The results revealed signiﬁcant groups
differences from pre-test to post-test for physical sensations words,
F(3,73) ¼ 6.52, p < .05, and for social threat words, F(3,73) ¼ 5.35,
p < .05. Post-hoc comparisons with the Fisher’s LSD showed sig-
niﬁcant differences on social threat words between the Standard
CBM-I and Control conditions t(37) ¼ 2.34, p < .05, the Explicit
CBM-I and Control, t(37) ¼ 2.18, p < .05, and the c-CBT and Control,
t(37) ¼ 2.74, p < .05. Furthermore, the post-hoc comparisons
indicated signiﬁcant differences on the physical sensation words
between the Explicit CBM-I and Control condition, t(37) ¼ 9.18,
p < .01. No signiﬁcant group differences were observed between
bias scores from pre-test to follow-up (t  1).
Taken together, these results suggest that immediately after
CBM-I training participants’ negative attentional biases towardsWork type Standard CBM-I Explicit CBM-I c-CBT Control
Pre-test
Threat 6.62 (6.53) 10.24 (5.26) 3.61 (4.26) .39 (3.29)
Physical 3.21 (1.16) 12.82 (6.05) 7.03 (4.55) L1.66 (3.44)
Positive .21 (2.86) .38 (3.36) 2.25 (4.92) L4.50 (2.94)
Post-test
Threat 6.50* (3.62) 3.50* (3.55) 4.58* (3.60) .29 (4.27)
Physical .91 (4.53) 9.00** (2.98) 1.33 (3.17) L4.76 (2.43)
Positive .68 (3.43) 1.53 (3.40) 1.34 (4.21) L2.29 (2.29)
Follow-up
Threat .18 (4.51) 1.47 (4.11) .39 (4.33) L1.71 (2.38)
Physical 1.44 (2.63) 4.50 (2.14) 3.86 (3.11) L1.32 (3.96)
Positive 1.94 (3.35) .15 (2.71) .53 (3.74) L2.92 (2.96)
Note: Signiﬁcant differences are shown between each group (Standard CBM-I,
Explicit CBM-I, c-CBT and Control) and the Control Condition (Bold).
*p < .05, **p < .01.
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maintained at one-week follow-up.
3.4. Social anxiety
Table 5 summarises the social anxiety (FNE) scores for each
group at pre-test, post-test, and one-week follow-up. The means of
FNE were subjected to analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with pre-
test FNE scores as covariate and the training conditions (Standard
CBM-I, Explicit CBM-I, c-CBT, and Control) as between-groups fac-
tor and post-test and follow-up FNE scores as within-group factors.
The result showed a signiﬁcant group  time interaction effect
F(3,73) ¼ 4.87, p < .004, h2 ¼ .17 (a medium effect size) . Post-hoc
LSD revealed signiﬁcant differences on FNE scores at follow-up
between Standard CBM-I and Control, t(37) ¼ 2.03, p < .05,
Explicit CBM-I and Control, t(37) ¼ 2.22, p < .05, and c-CBT and
Control, t(37) ¼ 3.12, p < .01. There was no signiﬁcant between-
group difference on the FNE scores at post-test F < 1.
Taken together, these results indicate that both the standard and
explicit CBM-I paradigms and c-CBT were effective in reducing
social anxiety symptom at one follow-up, although themean values
still remained above the cut-off point for FNE in all three training
groups.
3.5. Mediation analysis
The mediation analysis was conducted to examine whether
changes in either positive interpretations or attentional biases
would independently mediate change in social anxiety. We entered
group, change in interpretation and attentional biases, into a
regression model to predict change in social anxiety at follow-up as
a predicted variable. This analysis revealed that a signiﬁcant
interaction of group by interpretation bias scores, R2 ¼ .46, b ¼ .38,
p < .02. The change in positive interpretations was a signiﬁcant
predictor of change in the FNE scores, b¼ .52, p< .03. The change in
the attentional bias scores was not a signiﬁcant predictor, b ¼ .19,
p > .20. These results suggest that only changes in positive in-
terpretations mediated the CBM-I effect on social anxiety.
4. Discussion
The central feature of CBT models of social anxiety is that
socially-anxious individuals have cognitive vulnerability to social
anxiety due to negative information processing biases (see Clark &
McManus 2002; Heinrichs & Hofmann, 2001; Hirsch & Clark 2004
for reviews). One can assume that reducing cognitive vulnera-
bility through modifying negative cognitive biases can reduce so-
cial anxiety symptoms. Thus, the main aim of this study was to
examine the effects of CBM-I positive training compared to an
analogue of computer-administered CBT program and to a non-
training intervention (passive control) on negative cognitive bia-
ses and social anxiety symptoms.
The ﬁrst prediction was that both methods of CBM-I positive
training (standard and explicit CBM-I) would decrease negativeTable 5
Means and standard deviations of the FNE scale for each group at pre-test and one-
week follow-up (N ¼ 76).
Standard CBM-I Explicit CBM-I c-CBT Control
Pre-test 23.26 (3.69) 24.06 (3.53) 23.79 (3.92) 24.39 (3.24)
Post-test 23.21 (3.79) 23.44 (3.36) 22.89 (4.77) 23.56 (5.03)
Follow-up 20.89* (3.56) 19.94* (3.24) 18.53** (3.50) 23.72 (3.70)
Note: Signiﬁcant differences are shown between each group (Standard CBM-I,
Explicit CBM-I, c-CBT and Control) and the Control Condition (Bold).
*p < .05, **p < .01.interpretations in socially-anxious individuals as compared to a
control condition. The results revealed that after CBM-I high
socially-anxious participants who were trained to access positive
interpretations, either standard or explicit instructions, produced
lower recognition ratings for negative interpretations (or higher
recognition ratings for positive interpretations) of new ambiguous
scenarios as opposed to a control condition. These ﬁndings suggest
that both standard and explicit CBM-I training programs increased
positive interpretations of the ambiguous social scenarios. These
results are consistent with the previous research ﬁndings (e.g.,
Beard & Amir, 2008; Murphy et al., 2007) indicating that it is
possible to reduce a negative interpretation bias and facilitate a
positive interpretation bias of ambiguous social scenarios in
socially-anxious individuals. Furthermore, the mediation analysis
showed that positive endorsement of ambiguous scenarios medi-
ated the CBM-I effects on social anxiety. This implies that CBM-I
training reduced social anxiety possibly through changes in inter-
pretation biases rather than attentional biases.
It was also hypothesised that providing the explicit instructions
would enhance the CBM-I induced positive changes in interpreta-
tive bias and social anxiety as compared to the standard CBM-I
training condition. The results were inconsistent with this hy-
pothesis indicating no signiﬁcant differences between standard and
explicit CBM-I conditions. This is inconsistent with the view that
explicit instructions to selectively process information may some-
times be unhelpful in CBM approaches (MacLeod, Martinez et al.,
2009). Some studies using different variants of CBM did provide
explicit instructions and still obtained beneﬁcial effects of CBM
delivery. For example, in a study by Watkins and colleagues
(Watkins et al., 2009) participants with dysphoria were given
explicit instructions to actively engage in generating concrete
construals (e.g., focussing on the speciﬁc details of an event, on
what makes each event unique, and on the process of how it
happened) when imagining emotional events, as opposed to the
abstract-overgeneral bias. The results showed that this concreteness
training with explicit instructions decreased depressive symptoms
and rumination in a subclinical sample. In another study, partici-
pants who were explicitly instructed to rehearse new appraisals of
negative events showed a decrease in negative emotional reactions
to them (Schartau et al., 2009). It is also possible that participants in
the standard CBM-I training learn some rules such as making a
different kind of interpretation (Brosan, Hoppitt, Sillence, Shelfer, &
Mackintosh, 2011) or imagining positive outcomes (Blackwell &
Holmes, 2010), which then they can apply this in their daily life.
Furthermore, it is highly likely that in the standard CBM-I paradigm
participants become aware of the intention of the training through
repeated practice of positive resolutions of the scenarios. In a study,
Salemink and colleagues found that the vast majority of their par-
ticipants were aware of the emotional outcomes of the disambig-
uations of the passages and this awareness partially mediated the
effects of training direction on interpretive bias (Salemink, van den
Hout, & Kindt, 2007). In the present study, we did not measure
participants’ awareness of the intention of the training in standard
CBM-I but similar to Salemink at al.’s study majority of the partic-
ipants reported having some knowledge of the direction of the
training, i.e., positive resolution of the scenarios.
One may argue that making the rule to select positive meaning
explicit generated expectancy about the direction of training out-
comes which can result in transitory less negative and more posi-
tive ratings of the recognition sentences (a placebo effect). Future
studies using a control condition matched for expectancy and in-
structions, but without the ‘active’ element of CBM may shed more
light on this expectancy effect. However, the fact that there was no
enhanced effect of explicit instructions indicates that this effect is
unlikely.
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about the intention of the CBM-I training did not result in enhanced
positive changes in interpretative bias or social anxiety. However, it
is not clear whether providing explicit instructions about the
applicability of CBM-I materials and practicing positive resolutions
in real-life situations would enhance the effectiveness of CBM-I on
reducing social anxiety. Also unlike Watkins et al.’s (2009) study,
we did not instruct participants about the possible relationship
between positive resolutions of CBM-I scenarios and reductions in
their social anxiety. It would be interesting to investigate this
further by providing more explicit instructions about the associa-
tion between positive resolutions of ambiguity in real-life social
situations and social anxiety.
In this study, the c-CBT programwas designed as a single session
of short, condensed computerised CBT and used as an alternative
intervention to compare CBM-I with an analogue of computerised
CBT. Consistent with the second hypothesis, the results also showed
that a single-session computer-administered CBT for social anxiety
increased positive interpretations of ambiguous scenarios in
socially-anxious participants. This is consistent with the ﬁnding
reported by Franklin and colleagues that socially-phobic individuals
treated with 14-weekly group CBT exhibited less negative inter-
pretation bias than untreated socially-phobic individuals (Franklin
et al., 2005). This ﬁnding is promising because it indicates that
similar to a long-termCBT treatment, a computer-administered CBT
program can generate more positive (or less negative) in-
terpretations of ambiguous social situations. One possible expla-
nation for positive changes in interpretations biases via c-CBT is that
this program increased participants’ awareness of the role of nega-
tive thinking pattern (e.g., negative automatic thoughts, dysfunc-
tional assumptions) in social anxiety which in turn resulted inmore
positive interpretations of the ambiguous social scenarios.
It was assumed that the CBM-I training would reduce selective
attention to threatening stimuli. Consistent with this hypothesis,
the results showed that, to some degree, CBM-I reduced negative
attentional biases towards threat information. These results are in
line with the ﬁndings of two previous studies (Amir, Bomyea, &
Beard, 2010; White et al., 2011) demonstrating that modiﬁcations
of one component of information processing, i.e., attention or
interpretation, can also result in changes in the other component.
These ﬁndings suggest that targeting interpretation biases through
CBM-I positive training may also have some positive immediate
effects on modifying attention bias. However, it should be noted
that despite some signiﬁcant changes in attentional bias at post-
test, the bias scores were not large in this sample and changes in
the bias scores were not sustained at one-week follow-up. Future
studies should investigate the effects of CBM-I on attentional bias
further possibly by comparing CBM-I with an attentional variant of
CBM (CBM-A).
Moreover, the results revealed a signiﬁcant reduction in social
anxiety with a medium effect size for the CBM-I and c-CBT condi-
tions at one-week follow-up. This is consistent with a previous
ﬁnding reported by Beard and Amir (2008) that changes in inter-
pretation bias reduced social anxiety symptoms. However, the fact
that despite positive changes in the FNE scale at follow-up, these
scores remained above the cut-off point (clinical signiﬁcance) for
the training conditions suggest that amulti-sessions CBM-I training
might produce a larger effect size which is clinically signiﬁcant. It
remains possible that genuine CBM-I or c-CBT induced changes in
cognitive biases might exert an impact that does not necessarily
concur with immediate changes in self-report questionnaires as
these measures assess mainly more prolonged behavioural and
emotional features.
Given the ﬁndings of the present study, it is important for future
CBM-I research to pursue new directions. One of the limitations ofthe present study was that the recognition test as a measure of
interpretation bias has not yet been validated for social anxiety. To
address this, the future research should focus on comparing two
distinct groups of people with clinical social anxiety and without
social anxiety on interpretations biases. This design can give more
information about the validity of this measure. Another limitation
of this study was that it was designed as a single session of CBM or
an analogue session of c-CBT. Despite some promising effects of
CBM-I and c-CBT in reducing negative cognitive biases in social
anxiety, it would be naive to expect that direct modiﬁcation of
cognitive biases through a single session will yield enduring ther-
apeutic beneﬁts. One would expect that multi-sessions CBM-I or c-
CBT programs would induce more durable changes in interpreta-
tion biases and social anxiety symptoms.
Moreover, multiple practices outside of the laboratory setting
(e.g., using home computer) may prove to result in more enduring
therapeutic effects on both cognitive biases and social anxiety
symptoms. This may be of a particular interest when applying CBM-
I to a clinical population. As MacLeod, Koster, and Fox (2009) sug-
gested, future researchers should investigate how to optimise the
transfer of CBM-induced cognitive changes from the laboratory into
the naturalistic setting and to effectively maintain these modiﬁed
selective processing across time. This is important for both theo-
retical and clinical reasons. From a theoretical point of view, it is
important to determine whether CBM-I induced changes funda-
mentally alter cognitive processes that cause and/ormaintain social
anxiety or if they simply produce transient, context-dependent
effects. It is also clinically important to determine whether the
CBM-induced changes can affect deeper levels of information
processing involved in maintaining social anxiety symptoms such
as negative self-appraisal (see Mobini et al., 2013). Finally, more
research is needed to provide evidence for clinical efﬁcacy and
effectiveness of CBM-I as compared to other well-established
treatments such as CBT (NICE, 2013) and whether CBM-I can be
used as an adjunct treatment method with CBT for social anxiety.5. Conclusions
Taken together, this study suggests that a single session of CBM-
I, using either standard or explicit instructions, and an analogue of
c-CBT program increased positive interpretations of ambiguous
scenarios and reduced social anxiety symptoms. Furthermore,
CBM-I programs reduced attentional biases towards threat infor-
mation. However, the durability of these modiﬁed cognitive biases
and changes in underlying cognitive processing (e.g., self-
appraisals) maintaining social anxiety remain to be seen. Further
research on CBM-I is of particular value in investigating the efﬁcacy
of this intervention in the treatment of social anxiety using rigours
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